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Abstract: 
 
The existence of multiple equilibria is one explanation for why some countries are rich while 
others are poor. This explanation also allows the possibility that changes in political and 
economic institutions might help poor countries "jump" from a bad economic equilibrium 
into a better one, permanently increasing their output and income. Experiments are a useful 
methodology to study the effect of institutions on economic growth. In this paper, we study a 
simple experimental economy in which agents produce output in each period and can allocate 
the output between consumption and investment (the experiment adds to the design of Lei 
and Noussair, 2002, 2003). Capital productivity is higher if total investment is above a 
threshold. The threshold externality generates two equilibria—a suboptimal “poverty trap” 
and an optimal “rich country” equilibrium—which differ by a factor of around three in the 
income they create. In baseline sessions, in which agents make independent decisions in a 
decentralized manner, the economies typically sink into the poverty trap and the optimal 
equilibrium is never reached. However, the ability to communicate before investing, or to 
vote on binding “industrial policy” proposals, improves average earnings. Communication 
enables agents to agree to restrain consumption to cross the capital threshold, and voting 
enables them to enforce such plans. Combining both of these simple institutions enables all 
of the economies to escape the poverty trap. This experimental environment constitutes a 
platform onto which more complex features can be added in a program of experimental 
growth economics.  
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1. Introduction 
Why are some countries rich while others are poor? There are many possible 
explanations, including differences in resources or geography, openness to international 
trade2, economic and political systems3, income and wealth inequality,4 country-specific 
cultural5 and historical factors6, and a multiplicity of equilibria.7 In fact, there is no shortage 
of possible explanations for cross-country disparities in economic growth; the problem is that 
there are too many plausible explanations, which are hard to clearly separate with available 
field data. Thus, while macroeconomists have learned much from field data, there are limits 
on their quality and quantity, so new types of data might be of potential use in investigating 
the nature of economic growth.   
This paper illustrates how new data for the study of economic growth can be 
generated from experimental political economies.8 The economies we study here have two 
equilibria, a poverty trap and an optimal steady state. This multiplicity of equilibrium is due 
to a productivity boost when aggregate capital reaches a critical threshold. Since theory gives 
little guidance about whether and which one of the two equilibria emerges reliably, and how 
institutions might influence equilibrium selection, empirical observations are useful. In 
discerning about a related topic9, Lucas (1986) suggested that experiments can help 
economists understand what happens when economic theory does not select one of many 
equilibria. He wrote: 
[since] economic theory does not resolve the question….It is hard to see what can 
advance the discussion short of assembling a collection of people, putting them in the 
situation of interest, and observing what they do. (p. 421) 
 
                                                 
2 E.g., Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001). 
3 E.g., Baumol (1986),  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), and Barro (1997). 
4 E.g., Alesina and Rodrik (1994) 
5 E,g. Knack and Keefer (1997). 
6 E.g., Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
7 E.g., Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). 
8 In a related direction, Cardenas and Carpenter (2004) use field experiments to measure parameters such as 
social capital and risk preferences to study development in small societies (i.e., villages). See also Angrist et al, 
(2002); and Ashraf, Karlan and Zin (2004). 
9 Lucas was referring to macroenvironments in which rational expectations allows multiple inflationary paths, 
and adaptive expectations predict a single path. But the same argument can be applied to any game or economy 
with multiple equilibra, where theory does not provide an overwhelming argument for emergence of one 
equilibrium over another. 
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Following Lucas’s suggestion, we construct experimental macroeconomies and 
observe what people do. Output, welfare, and consumption in many replications of these 
economies are then compared with theoretical benchmarks. We also study how 
“institutions”—changes in the rules governing what agents can say and do—affect economic 
outcomes, and whether these institutions influence equilibrium selection. 
Of course, experiments like these are much simpler than the naturally occurring 
economies we hope to eventually understand. Despite their simplicity, experiments have 
some merits in studying growth and institutions. In naturally occurring economies, 
institutions and institutional changes typically arise endogenously, rather than randomly, so 
that there is an endogeneity problem in inferring whether institutional changes influence 
growth.10 In experimental economies, endogeneity bias can be erased because institutions can 
be added and subtracted randomly under experimental control. In naturally occurring 
political economies, different institutions also tend to co-occur in clusters (for example, 
democratic voting and freedom of the press); this multicollinearity makes it difficult to 
isolate each institution’s separate effect. In contrast, in experiments, institutions can be 
changed one at a time to establish their separate effects, and can be mixed and matched to 
create hybrids that do not naturally occur (e.g. dictatorships with a free press).11  
Our experimental environment is an extension of the optimal growth model of 
Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965), and is well understood theoretically. 
The crucial extension is a threshold externality in capital productivity – there is a level of 
aggregate capital at which capital productivity jumps sharply. This threshold creates two 
equilibria. The better equilibrium gives every agent higher consumption and higher utility 
(which means higher dollar earnings for participants) than the worse equilibrium, which we 
call a technological poverty trap.12 The parametric structure of the economy and the initial 
                                                 
10 See Temple (1999), Islam (2003) or Durlauf and Quah (1999) for a discussion of empirical methodology and 
results with regard to international comparisons of rates of economic growth. 
11 Plott and George (1992) did experiments on one-period goods markets with two competitive equilibria. Duffy 
and Fisher (2004) studied a laboratory environment where random “sunspots” induce multiplicity of equilibria. 
12 Originally attributed to Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), the idea that multiple equilibria exist has led to a variety of 
growth models with multiple equilibria. For instance, Azariadis and Drazen (1990) construct an overlapping 
generations model with two stable Pareto-ranked equilibria. In the inferior equilibrium, no agent trades with 
members of other generations. Murphy et al. (1989) build a model with synergies among industries, where each 
industry is profitable only if other industries operate. There are Pareto-dominant equilibria where all of the 
industries operate and dominated equilibria where none operate. Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee et al. 
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endowments are chosen so that the poverty trap is likely to be reached; indeed, in these 
baseline cases, economies never fully escape the poverty trap.  Then, we add simple 
institutions to the baseline economy and determine whether these institutions enable 
economies to escape the poverty trap.   
The first institution we consider is a highly stylized version of “freedom of 
expression” in which all agents are allowed to engage in communication, unrestricted in 
content, in a “chat room” before each investment period. In principle, communication can 
enable agents to coordinate investment to cross the capital threshold. In many cases, 
communication also improves coordination onto Pareto-dominant equilibria in experimental 
games in many cases (see Camerer, 2003, chapter 7). Recording the chat messages also 
allows us to “eavesdrop” on what agents are thinking, which is often insightful.  
The second institution is a highly stylized version of a democratic voting process, like 
voting for an “industrial policy”. In each round, two agents are chosen randomly to submit a 
proposal specifying the quantity that each agent will consume and invest. The citizen/agents 
vote for proposals and the one elected by the majority is automatically implemented. Finally, 
a third institution combines the communication and voting treatments to see if they interact 
(e.g., agents might discuss the merits of different policies before voting or submitting 
proposals). The focus of our analysis is whether these economies sink into the poverty trap or 
escape it, and whether communication, voting, and the combination of the two affect 
economic outcomes.  
Since these experiments are the first to explore the effect of institutions on economic 
growth, we deliberately chose an environment familiar to growth economists, in the hope of 
initiating dialogue about what experimental data can tell us about growth. We also 
deliberately began with a simple setup that can be complicated in future experiments (a 
method used in all successful laboratory sciences). Starting with a more complicated design 
would be less likely to produce reliable results, and would make it more difficult to know 
what factors caused outcomes. Because the design is simple, the manner in which we create 
“free expression” and “democratic voting” captures few of the complexities of these 
                                                                                                                                                       
(2001) show that inequality and the resulting differential access to credit can keep an economy in a Pareto-
dominated equilibrium. See Azariadis (1993) and Cooper (2002) for a detailed treatment of the principal 
analytical issues in growth models with multiple equilibria. 
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institutions when they occur naturally. Furthermore, the fact that readers of this article can 
probably imagine many different versions of these institutions, or other design features, 
which are worthy of study, is evidence that the general design can be fruitfully used as part of 
a research program. This paper is just the start of such a program.  
The next section describes the experimental economy, the theoretical predictions, and 
the procedures of the experiment. In section three the results are reported. Section four is a 
summary and lists ideas for future research. 
 
2. The experimental environment, competitive equilibria, and procedures 
2.1. The environment 
We adopted the multiple equilibrium environment of Lei and Noussair’s (2003) 
study.13 At the aggregate level, the economy may be thought of as populated by an infinitely-
lived representative consumer with a lifetime utility given by: 
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ρ is the discount rate, Ct is the quantity of consumption at time t, and U(Ct) is the 
representative consumer’s utility of consumption. Alternatively, the expression in equation 
(1) may be thought of as the total value that an infinitely-lived group of agents receives from 
consumption. The economy faces a resource constraint: 
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δ is the depreciation rate, Kt is the economy’s aggregate capital stock at the beginning of 
period t, and A is an efficiency parameter on the production technology. The value of A 
depends on the current level of capital stock in the economy. A has the value A  above a 
threshold level of capital stock, Kˆ , and has the value A  below Kˆ , with AA < . The threshold 
                                                 
13 Lei and Noussair (2003) study an economy with the same parametric structure as the economies studied here. 
However, the two studies differ in that Lei and Noussair used double auction markets (Smith, 1962) rather than 
call markets, described in section 2.3.4, to exchange output. They also do not include the insitutional structures, 
described in section 2.4, that serve as the primary focus of this study. 
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can be interpreted as a positive externality in production, generated by a sufficiently large 
aggregate quantity of capital stock in the economy.14 Table 1 lists the numerical parameters 
of the experimental economy. 
 
[Table 1: About here] 
 
In the experiment, the aggregate production capability and the value of consumption 
of units of output are divided among five heterogeneous agents populating the economy. 
Each subject i is given two individual production schedules that show how capital itk  is 
transformed into output )(* it
i kfA , depending on whether total capital Kt = ktii∑ is above or 
below the threshold of 31. The marginal utility of consumption of agent i is a discrete 
approximation of it
i
t
i cicv 204396)(' −+= . The utility function for consumption is expressed 
in terms of an experimental currency called “Yen,” which is converted into US dollars at the 
end of the experiment at a predetermined, privately-known exchange rate. Agents’ utility and 
production functions were private information. The economy’s aggregate production and 
demand curves are shown in Figure 1. Keep in mind, however, that each subject had different 
privately-known curves, and no subject directly saw the aggregate curves shown in Figure 1.  
 
[Figure 1: About Here] 
 
2.2. Competitive equilibria 
In this economy, there are two stationary stable rational expectations competitive 
equilibria. One of these equilibria is also an optimal steady state. The optimal steady state is 
the outcome the economy would asymptotically converge to if it were under the direction of 
a benevolent social planner. Such a planner would choose C1…,C∞ to maximize (1), subject 
to (2), (3), and the constraints that Ct ≥ 0, Kt ≥ 0 and tt KK )1(1 δ−≥+  (gross investment in 
every period must be non-negative). Table 2 shows the values of the key variables in the 
                                                 
14 See Azariadis (1993) and Azariadis and Drazen (1990) for discussion of growth models with a threshold 
externality in production. 
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Pareto-dominant equilibrium (the optimal steady state)15 and the Pareto-dominated 
equilibrium (the poverty trap). 
 
[Table 2: About here] 
 
2.3. Procedures 
2.3.1. General procedures 
 The experiment consisted of a total of 21 sessions. There were four treatments in the 
experiment, which differ only by their institutional structures. The four treatments are called 
baseline, communication, voting, and hybrid (each is described in more detail later). Subjects 
were undergraduates at Emory University and the California Institute of Technology. Table 3 
details when and where sessions were conducted, and average earnings.16  Subjects 
participated in this experiment only once (though many had been in other, unrelated 
experiments). The next three subsections briefly describe the experiment.  
 
[Table 3: About here] 
2.3.2. Timing within a session 
Five agents participated in each session and were grouped togetner in the same 
economy. In each session, the experimenter distributed instructions, read them aloud, and 
conducted a three-period practice horizon (which did not count toward subjects’ earnings).  
                                                 
15 The optimal equilibrium capital/consumption combination, (Kt, Ct) = (45, 70), has the property that from any 
initial level of capital stock K0 > 0, including K0 = 9, the optimal sequence of consumption and investment 
decisions of a hypothetical benevolent social planner converges asymptotically to (45, 70). At an initial capital 
level of Kt = 25, the optimal sequence is a constant level of capital and consumption of (45, 70). Thus, (Kt, Ct) = 
(45, 70) is an optimal steady state for our economies. At this optimal steady state, which is a Pareto-optimal 
competitive equilibrium for our decentralized economies, each agent consumes 14 units per period for an 
economy-wide total of 70 units of consumption, and the capital stock is distributed among the agents in the 
following manner: 121 =k , 92 =k , 63 =k , 84 =k , and 105 =k , where ik is the equilibrium capital 
holding of agent i, yielding a total of 45 units. At the Pareto inferior equilibrium agents 1 to 4 each consume 3 
units and agent 5 consumes 4 units per period for a total consumption of 16. The allocation of capital stock in 
this equilibrium is 11 =k , 22 =k , 13 =k , 24 =k , and 35 =k , yielding a total equilibrium capital stock 
of 9 units. 
16 All sessions were conducted in dedicated experimental laboratories at the two universities. Subjects were paid 
an initial fee of either $5 or $10 for their participation, depending on the session and their role in the 
experimental economy. Additional earnings from their activity in the economies described below ranged from 
$11.56 to $47.26. 
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Each session had several horizons, each with a variable number of periods. The 
number of periods in each horizon were determined by rolling a ten-sided die, after each 
period. If the die came up 1 or 2, the horizon ended and all capital disappeared.  If the die 
came up 3-10, the horizon continued. The number of horizons in different sessions ranged 
from 2 to 8 (see Table 3). In theory, if agents are risk-neutral, then a random ending should 
induce behavior which is theoretically equivalent to an infinite time horizon with discounting 
(as in the section 2.1, i.e., theory). The random ending appears to work adequately in other 
experimental domains.17  
Each session was scheduled for a three-hour time interval. The instructions indicated 
that if the current horizon ended with more than 30 minutes remaining in the three-hour 
interval, a new horizon would be started with the same initial endowments of 5 units of 
capital and 10,000 Yen per person. Since initial endowments for each new horizon were 
independent of any activity in prior horizons, restarting after an exogenous random ending 
does not distort optimal decisions. Subjects were informed that if a horizon did not terminate 
by the end of the third hour of a session, it would continue on another evening.18 Out of 21 
sessions, none actually had to be continue on another day.  
 
2.3.4. Timing within a period  
The sequences of activities within each period, in each of the four treatments, is 
shown in Figures 2a – 2d. In all treatments, each period consisted of two decision stages: 
Trading in a market for output (stage 1), and either a private or a voting procedure to 
determine consumption (stage 2).  We will now describe the timing in the baseline treatment 
as depicted in Figure 2a. 
                                                 
17 Under the assumption that agents in the experiment are risk neutral in their final monetary payment, a 
constant probability of 20% of the horizon ending in each period is equivalent to an infinite horizon in which 
ρ=0.25. Other authors have used a similar rule to create the incentives of infinite horizon models in the 
laboratory. See for example Camerer and Weigelt (1993), Noussair and Matheny (2000), and Lei and Noussair 
(2002, 2003). 
18 Subjects were told that they would be free to return for that session and continue in their same roles at the 
point at which they left off. If a subject was unwilling or unable to return, a substitute would be recruited to 
replace him. The horizon earnings of the substitute would be awarded to the original subject as well as to the 
substitute himself. This technique preserves the incentive for subjects to behave as if they were to participate 
until the end of the horizon. 
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In the baseline treatment, the timing of events within a period were as follows: At the 
beginning of period t, production occurred automatically as the computer program mapped 
kti, the capital stock that each individual held, into output (cti + kt+1i), according to the 
individual’s production function fi (kti). Subjects then participated in a market for output 
(stage 1). Each agent received an endowment of cash (10,000 currency units) to buy and sell 
output. The cash was convertible to dollar earnings at a conversion rate that was privately 
known to each subject in advance, so the cash had intrinsic value. Since the agents’ utility 
and production functions were different, there were gains from trade in the exchange of 
output.  
Output was traded in a “call market”.19 Agents submitted demand curves specifying a 
sequence of (weakly) declining integer limit prices for each unit of capital that they wished to 
buy.20 An aggregate demand curve was then constructed from the individual curves in the 
usual way. The aggregate supply curve was vertical—the total amount of output available in 
the economy for the current period, Kt. The market-clearing price, Pt was the lowest accepted 
bid—the Kt-th highest bid among all players, which is also the intersection of aggregate 
demand and supply. A player’s gross purchase of capital was the number of units he or she 
demanded at the price Pt or higher (with ties at the price Pt broken randomly). The net 
purchase of capital was the gross purchase minus the pre-trade holding. After the market was 
called, each agent either (a) paid Pt for each net unit he purchased, or (b) received Pt for each 
net unit he sold.21  
In stage 2, agents chose how much of the output to consume. In the baseline 
treatment, after market transactions were made, agents chose how much of their new post-
trade output to allocate to consumption cti. Before making their decisions, agents could use a 
                                                 
19 Call markets do not converge as rapidly as double auctions, but they are fast to execute and enable many units 
to trade rapidly, which is an important property in an environment where there can be a large number of units of 
output in the optimal equilibrium. Furthermore, our baseline results replicate Lei and Noussair’s (2003) 
identical economy which used double auctions, suggesting a robustness of basic findings across output-trading 
institutions. 
20 Agents submitted at least one price for each unit they held. For example, an agent with 14 units had to submit 
at least 14 positive prices. This guaranteed that the aggregate demand curve did not result in a zero price. 
21 In formal notation, the market reallocated output in the following manner. In period t each agent i submitted 
a demand curve dit(p), where p was the price for output. An algorithm then calculated Σidit(p), and solved for the 
price p* at which Σidit(p*) = Σifi(kti). Agent i’s final allocation of output was equal to dit(p*). The net change in 
his holding of output was equal to dit(p*) – fi(kti). Each agent i received a cash transfer of p*[fi(kti) - dit(p*)]. 
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simulator which allowed them to study, by submitting hypothetical consumption and 
investment scenarios, how their choice of cti affected their utility of consumption ui(cti), their 
remaining capital stock kt+1i, and the quantity of output they would have at the beginning of 
the next period f i(kt+1i). If the horizon continued (with probability 0.8), the unconsumed 
output of each individual automatically became kt+1i. At the beginning of period t+1, 
production occurred as kt+1i was mapped into output (ct+1i + kt+2i), according to the function 
fi(kt+1i), for all i, and the sequence repeated itself. 
The sequence of events in the communication treatment (Figure 2b) was identical to 
the baseline treatment, except that agents were allowed to communicate with each other 
before the call market opened. Each agent’s screen displayed a chat-room, which could be 
used to send and receive messages in real time for up to three minutes. Communication was 
unrestricted and all agents could read all messages.  
The sequence of events in the voting treatment (Figure 2c) was identical to the 
baseline treatment until stage 2. In stage 2, consumption was not determined privately by 
individual agents as in the baseline treatment. Instead, two agents were randomly chosen22 in 
each period and told the amount of output currently held by each agent after the output 
market had closed. (Note that the proposers did not know other agents’ utility or production 
functions, which remained private at all times.) Proposers then submitted proposals 
specifying how many units each agent in the economy would consume in that period. A 
proposal was a five-element vector of consumption levels, one element corresponding to 
each agent. The two proposals appeared simultaneously on all agents’ computer screens. All 
agents were then required to vote for exactly one of the two proposals. The proposal that got 
the majority of the five total votes was immediately enacted, and each agent consumed the 
amount specified in the winning proposal.  
The first stage of the hybrid treatment (Figure 2d) was identical to stage 1 of the 
communication treatment. Stage 2 was identical to that of the voting treatment. Keep in mind 
                                                 
22 Endogenizing which agents made proposals, and “campaigning,” are obvious next steps. Because the 
experiments are already rather complex, we elected to begin with the simplest “anybody can grow up to be 
President” design. It also provides a benchmark sample of random-proposer sessions against which 
endogeneous-proposer designs can later be compared. 
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that in the hybrid treatment, communication takes place before proposals are made and voted 
upon.  
 
[Figures 2a-2d: About here] 
 
2.3.6. Initial Endowments and Agent Incentives       
Each of the five agents got an initial endowment of five units of capital, so the 
aggregate initial capital was 0K = 25. The initial endowments were chosen so that the poverty 
trap outcome was likely to occur (based on earlier results of Lei and Noussair, 2003) in the 
baseline condition. This design choice permits us to see whether institutions can get 
economies out of the poverty trap.  
Player i’s period t earnings, in terms of experimental currency, were given by ui(cit) + 
mi1t – mi0t, where ui(cit) denotes i’s earnings from consumption, and mi0t and mi1t denote i’s 
cash holdings at the beginning and the end of period t, respectively. Over each horizon, 
individual i’s earnings, were given by Σt[ui(cit) + mi1t – mi0t], the total earnings in all of the 
periods t making up the horizon. Because there was always an 80% chance the horizon would 
continue, each individual had an incentive to hold some output in the form of investment to 
allow consumption or sales in future periods in the horizon. An agent also had an incentive to 
sell output if the price was high, in order to increase his end of period cash holdings, as well 
as an incentive to purchase output at low prices in order to consume, produce more output in 
future periods, or resell in future periods at a higher price. Over an entire experimental 
session, participant i’s dollar earnings were equal to τi+ γi(ΣjΣt[ui(cit) + mi1t – mi0t]). Subscript 
j indexes the horizon within an experimental session, t is the period within a horizon, γi is 
agent i’s conversion rate from experimental currency to US dollars, and τi is agent i’s fixed 
participation fee.23 
 
2.4. Institutional Treatments and Possible Effects  
                                                 
23 The values of the fixed payments were $5 for players 1 and 2, and $10 for players 3, 4, and 5. The difference 
was to compensate players 3-5 for earnings in the experiment which were expected to be lower than for 1 and 2.  
In the baseline treatment, γi was 0.001 (1 Yen = γi US dollars for player i) for player 1 and 0.002 for players 2-5. 
In the other three treatments earnings were expected to be higher (and usually were), so the conversion rates 
were cut in half ( γi was 0.0005 for player 1 and 0.001 for players 2,…, 5).    
 11
 The four treatments in our experiment combine the absence or presence of 
communication and voting. The idea is to see whether communication and voting separately, 
and in combination, increase the likelihood that the economy avoids or escapes the poverty 
trap and reaches higher levels of output and welfare. 
Note that equilibrium selection in our economies is a coordination problem that 
requires agents to conserve enough output, together, to push aggregate capital above the 
threshold. Communication is known to improve convergence to Pareto-dominant equilibria 
in normal form games (Camerer, 2003, Ch. 7). Communication could also interact with 
voting by enabling agents to talk about what kinds of consumption plans are best. In the field, 
the existence of institutions promoting communication between economic agents, such as 
free speech or a free press, has been statistically associated with higher rates of economic 
growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin,1995; Barro, 1997).  
In the voting treatments, the ability for an individual agent to commit all five agents 
to a winning proposal also provides a way to solve the coordination problem. For example, if 
one of the two agents selected to propose investment plans in each period acts like a 
benevolent social planner, and agents endorse her plan, then the steady-state optimum can be 
implemented in the voting treatment. In the field, democratic institutions are positively 
associated with higher rates of economic growth (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Our 
voting treatment enables the simplest possible training-wheels version of democratic 
politics—competition among proposals and automatic enforcement of an elected policy.  
  
3. Results 
 The results section proceeds in six parts. First we present some basic comparisons 
across sessions and treatments. In subsection 3.2, we use a simple partial-adjustment model 
to forecast long-run results from the short-run data of each experimental session. Subsection 
3.3 dissects different sources of inefficiencies in the entire economy (e.g., accumulating too 
little capital, versus allocating it inefficiently across agents).  Subsection 3.4 looks at how 
economies manage to avoid the poverty trap, and how communication and voting work and 
interact.  
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3.1 Comparisons across sessions, and across treatments 
Figures 3 – 6 show aggregate consumption behavior, Ct, in each session of the four 
treatments. Each chart illustrates the time series of Ct for one session. Each Figure shows all 
the sessions from each treatment. The horizontal axes show the periods in a session. The 
dashed horizontal lines are the optimal equilibrium and the poverty trap levels of 
consumption, which are C*H=70 and C*L=16 units, respectively. The discontinuities in the 
time series represent the starts of new horizons. Consumption is highly correlated with 
welfare. Analogous data for aggregate capital stock Kt across the four treatments are depicted 
in Figures 7 - 10. 
[Figures 3 – 10: About Here] 
 
Figure 3 shows that for the baseline treatment, the poverty trap is a powerful attractor. 
In four of five sessions, consumption (Figure 3) and total capital (Figure 7) remain close to 
the poverty trap level. Figure 7 shows that in one of these five sessions (Emory B3), the 
economy invests sufficiently in capital to surpass the threshold of 31 units in the first 
horizon, but it is unable to attain the threshold level of capital after that horizon ends, in the 
remainder of the session. In another session, Caltech B2, the capital stock surpasses the 
threshold in two different horizons, but in three horizons in between these two, the economy 
is in the poverty trap. These sessions show that avoiding the poverty trap in early periods or 
early horizons does not guarantee successful avoidance of poverty traps later. The fact that 
these baseline economies do not persistently exit the poverty trap replicates the results of Lei 
and Noussair (2003). 
 
3.2 Forecasts of long-run results and comparison across treatments 
Since the experimental sessions are constrained by the time in which agents can 
continuously participate, it is useful to have a rough extrapolation of what might happen if 
the sessions continued longer. The best available econometric tool is a statistical model that 
uses all the data from one session to forecast what would be likely to happen if that session 
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continued indefinitely. Equation (4) is a specification, used previously24, which uses data 
from one session to forecast long-run behavior:  
Yjt = B1 1t + B2
t −1
t
+ ε j +ν jt    (4) 
In this regression, Yjt is a dependent variable of interest, either the total utility U(Ct) = 
∑iui(cit) actually realized in the economy, or the economy-wide capital stock Kt = ∑ikit, at 
time t. Period t is the period number within a horizon, j indexes the horizon within a session. 
Β1 and B2 are the coefficients which are estimated from the data. The specification assumes 
that each horizon’s dependent variable value is a period-weighted average of an initial 
condition value (Β1, when period t=1) and a long-run steady state value Β2 (the limiting value 
as t→∞). We call the estimate Β2 the convergence value of the dependent variable for the 
session. We will say that the dependent variable is converging to a particular level, such as an 
equilibrium prediction, if the convergence value Β2 is not significantly different from that 
predicted level. Since horizons within each session appear to be different (see Figures 3-10), 
we account for horizon-specific disturbances when estimating convergence levels by 
including a random-effects disturbance εj for horizon j.  
Figure 11 plots the maximum likelihood estimates of the convergence values (i.e., 
estimates of Β2) for the dependent variables of total capital (x-axis) and total welfare (y-axis) 
of each of the 21 experimental sessions. Each circle corresponds to estimates from one 
session. The shaded lines through each point represent the width of 95% confidence intervals 
on each axis. The dotted lines represent the competitive equilibria. The intersection of the 
dotted lines in the lower left (bottom) indicates the poverty trap equilibrium; the intersection 
of the lines in the upper right (top) indicates the optimal equilibrium levels of consumption 
and welfare. Tables A-1 and A-2 in the Appendix contain the precise estimates of 
convergence values and standard errors.25 
                                                 
24 Noussair et al. (1995, 1997) used this specification to estimate convergence of experimental international 
economies. Our analysis expands Noussair’s by allowing different experimental sessions to have different 
steady-state levels, to explore reliability of convergence across experimental replications.  
25 In order to test the relevance of estimating the maximum-likelihood random-effect model, we compared our 
model to an OLS model using the Hausman specification test. The resulting chi-square statistic was significant 
at the 5 percent level for 19 out of 21 estimations, where each estimation corresponds to one session. This 
supports the hypothesis that the maximum-likelihood random-effect model is the better specification for 
equation (4). 
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  [Insert Figure 11: About here] 
 
Since Figure 11 summarizes many important features of all 21 experimental sessions, 
we will work through it slowly, often referring back to the raw session-specific data as well.  
Figures 3 and 7 suggested that the baseline economies are unable to emerge persistently from 
the poverty trap equilibrium.  The upper-left “baseline” graph in Figure 11 confirms this 
impression: All five of the 2-dimensional confidence intervals, extrapolating short-run results 
to the long-run, include the poverty trap levels for either capital or welfare (the intersection at 
the lower left of the Figure 11 graph). If the definition of “escaping a poverty trap” is that 
both the extrapolated capital and welfare levels must be significantly above the poverty-trap 
levels, then none of these economies has clearly escaped poverty.26 This finding replicates 
Lei and Noussair’s (2003) results. The prevalence of poverty traps in the baseline treatment 
also sets the stage for a possible role of institutions in creating an escape from the poverty 
trap, toward the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. 
In the communication treatment (Figures 4 and 8 show capital and welfare in each 
session, respectively), outcomes are more variable across sessions than in the baseline 
treatment. This is a reminder that economies which have an identical parametric structure, 
drawing participants randomly from the same population, can have different trajectories for 
reasons that are completely endogenous. Figure 4 shows that two of the communication 
sessions, Caltech C2 and Caltech C3, surpass the threshold level of capital and consumption 
moves toward the optimum. Two other sessions, Emory C3 and Caltech C1, remain near the 
poverty trap. The estimated convergence values of capital and welfare for the communication 
treatment, as shown in the lower-left graph in Figure 11 (and Tables A1-A2), confirm the 
long-run implication of the observations from the charts of Figures 4 and 8: Two sessions are 
                                                 
26 Although session Caltech B2’s estimated convergence value for capital is not statistically different from 45 
(the optimal steady state level), its welfare convergence value is not statistically different from 5856 (the 
poverty trap). The same happens in session Emory C1 of the communication treatment. These examples show 
that an economy can escape poverty on one dimension but not necessarily another. While consumer welfare is 
the more important dimension (e.g., it determines, along with output-trading profits, how much agents actually 
earn), the capital measure is important too because an economy that has not significantly accumulated capital 
above the poverty-trap level is vulnerable to sinking back into poverty, as we see in sessions Emory B3 and 
Caltech B2. 
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stuck in the poverty trap, two are close to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium, and two are 
imprecisely predicted to end up in between the two equilibria.  
The voting treatment economies exhibit more variance within session (see Figures 5 
and 9) than either the baseline or the communication treatments. The reason for an increase 
in the variance appears to lie in the centralized nature of decision making. In contrast to the 
baseline and communication treatments, where individual agents determine their 
consumption and investment choices in each period, in the voting treatment investment and 
consumption decisions are made by majority choice from only two alternative plans, which 
change each period. This results in large swings in economic activity from period to period. 
The estimated convergence values from the voting sessions, shown in the upper right graph 
of Figure 11, have wider confidence intervals, but only one session appears to be stuck in the 
poverty trap in the (estimated) long-run. In three of the five sessions, the estimated 
convergence level of capital (x-axis) includes the optimal steady-state value; at the same 
time, only one session statistically includes the optimal welfare level. This contradiction 
between the ability of voting to create optimal levels of total capital accumulation, but 
welfare significantly below the optimum is a result of the centralized way in which capital 
and consumption are simultaneously allocated among agents. Individual behavior in the 
voting treatment, which is considered in more detail in section 3.4, provides insights into 
why capital accumulation can be optimal while welfare lags behind.  
The lower-right graph in Figure 11 shows that the hybrid treatment—communication 
and voting—is also variable (as shown by cross-session variability in Figures 6 and 10). 
However, Figure 11 shows that estimated convergence levels reliably escape the poverty trap 
in all five sessions. Two sessions, Emory H1 and Emory H2, attain welfare levels that are not 
significantly different from the optimal steady state.  
Differences across the experimental conditions that appear to be evident in Figures 3-
10 were also evaluated statistically using very conservative nonparametric rank-sum tests 
that treat each experimental session as one data point. We use the average value of total 
output and welfare across periods (to standardize sessions with different numbers of 
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periods27).  Table 4 shows the (one-tailed) p-values from Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests 
under the null hypothesis of no difference between treatments. 
 
[Insert Table 4: About here] 
 
Because there are only 5-6 data points in each treatment, there is only modest 
statistical power to detect differences across treatments. But even in this conservative test, we 
can reject equality of both output and welfare in the baseline versus voting, and baseline 
versus hybrid, comparisons. The test also rejects equality of welfare in the baseline versus 
voting and baseline versus hybrid treatments. Thus, voting appears to reliably improve 
capital and welfare statistically, and is often helped along by adding communication.  
Now we briefly summarize our observations from the 21 sessions (before proceeding 
to look more closely at how communication and voting work): 
 The baseline sessions never fully escape the poverty trap. Communication and voting 
generally improve outcomes. In the hybrid treatment, the convergence values always escape 
the poverty trap. The strongest conclusion we can justify statistically is this: Simple 
institutions can reliably achieve good economic outcomes which never occur spontaneously 
without those institutions, and can always avoid bad outcomes which are common without 
those institutions. 
As we describe later in section 3.4, communication in the hybrid treatment, improves 
both voter and proposer decisions. However, the voting process also distorts the economies 
by adding variance, which generally hurts capital-accumulation and welfare. Communication 
in the absence of voting usually clearly points to goals, but is not fully effective at 
coordinating capital-accumulation to exit the poverty trap. The next section measures the 
various kinds of efficiencies which can result.  
 
3.3 Sources of inefficiencies 
                                                 
27 Weighting each horizon equally (which effectively gives larger weight to periods in short horizons than 
periods in long horizons) gives very similar results.  
 17
Three types of allocative inefficiency can appear in these economies. The first 
inefficiency is an output gap, a lower actual production level than the highest possible 
production given the quantity of total capital in the economy. An output gap occurs in a 
period because the economy’s capital at the end of the period is allocated among agents 
suboptimally (i.e., total output would go up if the agents who have the highest marginal 
products for capital swapped units with other agents who have lower marginal products).  
The output gap is (F*(Σikit) - Σi  f o(kit))/ F*(Σikit), where F*(Σikit) is the maximum possible 
production possible with total capital stock Σkit, and Σi f o(kit) is the actual production. The 
output gap averages 39%, 32%, 34%, and 28% in the baseline, voting, communication and 
hybrid treatments, respectively. The hybrid communication-voting rules allocate capital best, 
but the differences are small. Further experiments could explore the effect of institutions 
which are better-suited to allocating capital more productively across agents (e.g., more 
developed capital markets or industrial policies), especially when there is rapid technological 
change.  
A second type of inefficiency is consumption inefficiency. The value of a given 
amount of aggregate consumption is maximized when the units are allocated to agents to 
equalize marginal utility of consumption. Consumption inefficiency is measured by the ratio 
(U(Ct) – Σvio(cit))/U(Ct), where Σvio(cit) is the actual total value of consumption that agents 
achieve in period t, and U(Ct) is the optimal level. This loss averages 4.9%, 6.2%, 6.4%, and 
8.6% in the baseline, voting, communication and hybrid treatments, respectively. These 
inefficiencies are low in all conditions because most economies converge to some 
equilibrium; so agents can discern the price of capital from the simple call market and 
consume optimally, which approximately equilibrates the marginal utility of consumption 
across agents (even though they have different utility functions).  
The third type of inefficiency is dynamic inefficiency, which results from suboptimal 
allocations to investment and consumption given future incentives. Let V(Kt) be the value of 
the economy’s capital stock in period t, assuming that the economy behaves like a benevolent 
social planner, making optimal decisions from period t onward. This value is an idealized 
benchmark which assumes the economy from period t onward is directed by a benevolent 
social planner who chooses aggregate levels and individual allocations of capital and 
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consumption to maximize total welfare. Given this hypothetical assumption, there is an 
optimal sequence of capital stock levels from period t on. The market value of a unit of 
capital under this assumption can be calculated for each current level of capital stock. The 
market value in period t is equal to the marginal utility of consumption in period t along the 
economy’s optimal trajectory. Let V(K*t) be the value of the optimal quantity of capital stock 
given the current level of output and V(Kt) be the value of the total level of capital generated 
from the individual agents’ actual choices in period t and assuming optimal decisions for the 
economy thereafter. The level of dynamic inefficiency in period t is (V(K*t) - V(Kt))/V(K*t). 
This gap measures whether agents are making mistakes by consuming rather than investing 
for the future (as an idealized benevolent planner would).  
This dynamic inefficiency measure shows the largest differences among treatments: 
22%, 13%, 12%, and 5%, in the baseline, voting, communication and hybrid treatments, 
respectively. The hybrid treatment has the lowest dynamic inefficiency, which implies that 
both voting and communication are useful for trading off short-run consumption for long-run 
investment.28  
Finally, we explore whether the price of capital reflects sensible guesses about future 
consumption. Figures 12-15 show the time series of the market price for capital in each 
session of the four treatments. These prices can be compared to a rational expectations price, 
which is calculated for each unit of output by assuming the entire economy behaves 
optimally from the current period onward. This per-unit value is given by V*(Kt)/Kt. The 
square-shaped markers in Figures 12-15 illustrate these rational-expectations predictions 
given the actual capital stock in each period t for each session. The figures show that actual 
prices closely follow rational expectation predictions.  
 
[Figures 12 -15: About here] 
 
3.4. How do the economies avoid the poverty trap? 
                                                 
28 The chat-room transcripts in both the communication and the hybrid sessions have no explicit attempts to 
reduce the output gap or consumption inefficiency. 
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The call market for capital in these experiments appears to lead the economies to the 
vicinity of one equilibrium or the other, but does not reliably generate capital accumulation 
above the threshold unless it is supplemented with communication or voting. When both are 
present, in the hybrid treatment, the economy surpasses the threshold. This subsection 
explores the mechanisms which produce a threshold-crossing.   
In the baseline treatment there were only three horizons in which the capital stock 
crossed the threshold of 31 (see Figure 7; Caltech B2, first and fifth horizons, and Emory B3, 
first horizon). In all three cases, one agent accumulated a large amount of capital by 
postponing consumption and bidding aggressively in the call market for capital, but the other 
four agents held small amounts. These single-handed efforts presumably were viewed as 
unprofitable and did not persist across consecutive horizons. The fact that these threshold-
crossings were created by individual action, and did not persist, indicates that specific 
mechanisms to coordinate behavior across all agents are necessary.  
 
3.4.1. The effect and content of communication 
The communication treatment sessions show that exchanging messages facilitates 
crossing the capital threshold in some horizons, but not in all of them (for example, in Emory 
C3 and Caltech C1 the economy never surpasses the threshold in any horizon).  In general, 
when the threshold was surpassed for the first time in a session, it followed an exchange of 
messages in which one agent would suggest that players consume very little or nothing, and 
two or more players indicated agreement. The dialogue29 in horizon 3 of Emory C2 is a good 
example of this pattern:   
Period 1:  
(player 5)>NOBODY CONSUME 
(player 1)>DONT CONSUME 
(player 4)>lets get this show on the road...move quick 
(player 5)>JUST THE FIRST ROUND, ITS WELL WORTH IT 
(player 1)>lose a lil...make a lot 
(player 3)>HOW 
(player 2)>by not consuming 
 
                                                 
29 Reading the dialogue gives insight into how the subjects approach the experiment, in their own language. One 
session began with a subject saying, “Let’s Enron this and make mad bread!”.  
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Period 2: 
(player 1)>GOOD JOB 
(player 4)>well done 
(player 5)>THAT A WAY TO DO IT 
 
In that session, four of the five agents endorse holding back consumption in the first period 
and they do cross the threshold. The subsequent period 2 messages are verbal high-fives.   
Dialogue in horizon 2 of Emory C1 is another example, but with less initial 
agreement:   
Period 1 
(player 4)>HOLD K for a round 
(player 2)>once again...lets keep all our k...nobody consume this round 
(player 4)>is that good player 1 and 5 
(player 1)>we say that every round and no body does it 
(player 5)>we only have a few min. left 
(player 4)>just do it for the first round and we all will have a lot more to use 
 
Period 2: 
(player 4)>SEE! 
(player 3)>good work 
(player 2)>wanna do it again? 
(player 3)>let's let it keep growing  
 
Notice that in period 1, after player 4 proposes to “HOLD K” and player 2 provides a 
seconding vote, player 1 is grumpy and skeptical. But a majority of players do hold capital 
and the aggregate capital crosses the threshold. In the next period, player 2 gloats, “SEE!” 
Player 3 (who said nothing in period 1) now chimes in and agrees. The economy then stayed 
above the threshold for the rest of the horizon and session. 
To show whether these patterns are typical, Figure 16a displays the capital stock held 
at the end of each period on the y-axis; the threshold of 31 is the horizontal line. The 
numbers on the graph are the number of agents who either proposed to keep capital, or 
agreed with such a proposal, before each period. Periods in which the capital stock started 
below the threshold, then crossed it (or started above the threshold right away), usually 
coincided with a shift in the number of people agreeing with the proposal to keep capital, 
from a minority to a majority. For example, in Emory C2, in the second horizon, which lasted 
only one period, only one agent proposed to keep capital. In the third horizon (the 10th period 
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of the experiment), three people agreed and the capital stock crossed the threshold. When 
there was never a shift to a majority, the economy never got out of the trap (e.g., the 
agreement count numbers are only zero or one in Emory C3). But note that majority 
endorsement of capital accumulation seems to be necessary to cross the threshold, but not 
sufficient, because there are horizons with majority agreement in which capital accumulation 
did not result (e.g., Emory C1, horizon 1 and Caltech C1, horizons 1, 4, and 5). These 
exceptions show that being able to enforce verbal agreements through binding votes may add 
to nonbinding communication. 
 
[Figure 16a: About here] 
 
Formal analysis of the content of communication is messy but worth a brief and 
rough exploration. Comments can be divided into three categories likely to be relevant to 
economic performance: “Don’t consume”, “Keep K (general)”, and “Specific proposal for 
investment”. The first category consists of proposals suggesting zero consumption for all 
traders. The second category is a general statement that more capital should be held but does 
not propose specific actions. The third category includes specific suggestions such as 
“everyone hold on to 7”, and “everyone try to keep 9-10”. Table A-3 in the Appendix 
summarizes the content and timing of messages across sessions.  
We use a random effects regression to estimate the effects of these comments on 
investment. The regression pools all sessions within a treatment and allows horizon-specific 
and session-specific disturbances. The dependent variable is the total number of units of 
capital Kt allocated for investment in the economy in period t. The independent variables are 
dummy variables for the three categories of messages listed above (coded as 1 if that 
message was used at all, and 0 otherwise), and total output which is available to divide 
between consumption and capital Kt. Each session and each horizon is assumed to have a 
random effect.  
Table 5 shows the results of the regressions for the communication and hybrid 
treatments (the hybrid results are discussed below). Under the communication treatment, 
vague general suggestions to hold capital do not significantly affect the levels of investment. 
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However, specific proposals and the admonishment to not consume are significantly 
positively correlated with investment (i.e., the “specific proposal” and “don’t consume” 
dummies are significant at the 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively). 
 
[Table 5: About here] 
 
A next step in studying communication is to further design experiments in which one 
or more agents are instructed to make comments which are correlated with avoidance of 
poverty traps. This would help us understand which types of messages reliably cause agents 
to achieve higher capital accumulation and better coordination.  
 
3.4.2. The effect and results of voting  
This subsection explores what agents proposed, and which of the two proposals each 
agent voted for, in the voting treatment. Each individual vote is a unit of observation. We 
include three variables that might correlate with voting. The first variable is “Higher 
consumption for the voter”. This is a dummy variable which is 1 for the proposal that gives 
the agent higher consumption. This picks up purely short-run voting.  The second variable is 
“Closer to the myopic optimum consumption.” Myopic optimal consumption cm is defined as 
consumption which equalizes marginal utility of consumption with the expected future price 
of capital (assumed to be the current price). The “closer to” variable is a dummy which 
equals 1 for the proposal which is closest numerically to cm.  This variable picks up voting 
which is rational but also myopic, because it neglects the effect of lower consumption on 
surpassing the critical threshold. Finally, “More equal capital”, is our third variable. This is a 
dummy variable which is 1 for the proposal that gives the most equal allocation of capital 
across agents.30 Equality of capital is inefficient (because agents have different utilities and 
productivity), but might be an expression of an egalitarian preference or a heuristic (and is 
also suggested in some communication transcripts).   
                                                 
30 Equality is measured by the difference between the highest and the lowest levels of proposed investment for 
agents. 
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The dependent variable is 1 when a subject votes for a proposal and 0 otherwise31. 
Table 6 displays the results of a random-effects logit model, with horizon-specific and 
session-specific disturbances. The only feature of proposals which produces significant 
increases in voting for those proposals is “Higher consumption for the voter”. 
 
[Table 6: About here] 
 
Summary statistics about which proposals were elected show mixed success. In both 
the voting and hybrid treatments, when both proposals forced total capital above the 
threshold of 31, the one which “cleared the bar” by the least (i.e., minimizing the amount of 
capital above 31 or equivalently, maximizing consumption) was chosen in 17 of 18 cases.   
However, when the economy was below the capital threshold and exactly one of the two 
proposals forced total capital above the threshold (which also means less consumption), the 
threshold-crossing plan was only elected 12 times out of 21 (57%).32 This success rate 
improved to 9 out of 11 (82%) in the hybrid treatment where agents could talk about the 
proposals. Together, these data show that agents are naturally inclined to vote for plans with 
more consumption (and hence less investment); as a result, they do not always vote for the 
“fiscal austerity” plan that limits consumption in order to clear the capital-stock threshold. 
But communication helps, by allowing agents to talk each other into voting for the threshold-
clearing plan. 
While voting generally improved efficiency, there is also some evidence that 
determining investment purely by voting over proposals increased economic volatility: In 
each of the voting and hybrid treatments, there were two horizons in which the economy 
surpassed the threshold, then later fell below it, during the same horizon. This never 
happened in the treatments without voting.  
The individual agents who made proposals showed a lot of rationality and restraint in 
how much consumption they proposed for themselves. Their proposed own-consumption is 
                                                 
31  We excluded votes made by proposers, but including them does not alter the results much. Proposers do have 
a strong tendency to vote for their own proposals. 
32 The fact that the high-consumption, low-investment plan won 43% of the time is a simple experimental 
analogue of the difficulty many developing countries have in getting populations to accept fiscal austerity plans 
which impose short-run hardships but promise long-run development.  
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above their myopic optimum only 25% of the time.33 Proposers also do not favor themselves 
over others: The consumption they propose for themselves is higher than for all of the other 
four agents only 22% of the time, and higher than the proposed group average only 48% of 
the time. (With no favoritism, the latter figures would be 20% and 50%.) It appears that in 
this simple setting, either altruism or political competition between the two proposals is 
enough to restrain the proposers’ self-interest. This could be studied further by restricting 
competition—e.g., a dictator makes a single proposal, or after a proposal is elected the 
winning proposer becomes an incumbent with no competition for several periods.   
 
3.4.3 Interactions of communication and voting in hybrid periods 
In the hybrid treatment with voting, communication did not follow the same pattern 
as in the communication-only treatment. In only 6 of 15 instances in which the threshold was 
surpassed was there majority agreement to increase the capital stock during the pre-voting 
communication. Figure 16b shows the time series of capital stock and the number of agents 
who proposed or agreed to keep capital. An increase in that number does not appear to be 
necessary to cross the threshold, as it does in Figure 16a (the communication-only sessions).  
The voting process therefore appears to be a substitute for communication in coordinating a 
collective threshold-crossing decision.  When there is voting on proposals, agreement is not 
needed because a single enforceable proposal can do the job of verbal agreement. This 
substitution effect is also manifested in the regression of capital stock on the content of 
messages, shown in Table 5: In the hybrid case, none of the message dummy variables that 
were correlated with capital stock in the communication-only treatments are significant (two 
even have the wrong sign).   
In fact, in the hybrid treatment messages sometimes expressed a desire to consume a 
larger quantity (like special interest groups lobbying before an election), rather than calling 
for restrained consumption.  This message was never sent in the no-voting treatments 
because agents could consume as much as they wanted.  
Communication also substantially raised the number of proposals which planned to 
cross the capital-stock threshold in the right direction. When the economy was above the 
                                                 
33 All the statistics reported in this paragraph are almost identical in voting and hybrid sessions. 
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threshold in the previous period, 33% of the voting-only proposals would pull capital below 
the threshold, compared to only 17% in the hybrid case. When the economy was below the 
threshold in the previous period, only 36% of the voting-only proposals would push capital 
above the threshold, compared to 69% in the hybrid case. Pre-proposal communication is 
therefore very helpful in generating more proposals that create transitions in the right 
direction across the total capital threshold, and avoid transitions in the wrong direction.  
Communication also appears to constrain selfish proposer decisions that harm 
everyone. Without communication, 8.3% of all proposals (18 in total) proposed a plan in 
which the proposer would consume more than his or her myopic optimum, and total capital 
would end up below the threshold. These proposals impose a big drain on the economy 
(including the proposer’s own future consumption).  Such proposals were much more rare (3 
cases, 2% of the total) in economies with voting and communication.  
 
[Figure 16b: About here] 
  
4. Conclusion 
This paper reports exploratory experiments on economic growth, and the growth-
enhancing effects of institutions, in an environment with two equilibria—a poverty trap and a 
Pareto-superior equilibrium that results when total capital exceeds a threshold that boosts 
productivity. Experiments allow the actual behavior of the economy to be compared with the 
theoretically optimal path, because all of the theoretically-relevant variables are created and 
carefully controlled—except for human behavior, which is left up to the agents. Experiments 
like this are particularly useful when there are multiple equilibria, because theory gives little 
guidance about which equilibria are likely to emerge. Such experiments also enable us to 
study effects of exogenously-created institutions and create hybrid mixtures of institutions to 
break multicollinearity.  
 The baseline economies tend to reliably converge to the poverty trap (replicating 
earlier results with a different market for trading output).  This result shows that a market for 
output can lead to a competitive equilibrium, but the equilibrium that results is not typically 
Pareto-efficient. We can then see whether additional institutions help.  
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We focus on the simplest possible incarnations of two types of political economy 
institutions—free expression, in the form of  “chat room” communication before investment 
occurs, democratic majority-rule voting on binding proposals for how output is divided 
between consumption and investment, and a hybrid combination of communication and 
voting. Communication and voting both raise output and welfare over the baseline level. The 
combination of communication and voting does best of all. Extrapolating econometrically 
from each experimental session suggests that the baseline economies will never escape the 
poverty trap, and the hybrid (communication plus voting) economies will always escape the 
poverty trap. So institutions help. Why?  
In sessions with communication, regressions show that the capital stock is raised by 
specific messages about what to do, and pleas to consume less. Crossing the productivity 
threshold, at the critical capital stock of 31, seems to require one agent proposing to restrict 
consumption, and two more agents agreeing with this nonbinding proposal. This kind of de 
facto voting is necessary to push capital above the threshold, but is not sufficient.  
Voting is a little more effective than communication because proposals are binding. 
Voting also seems to mute the effects of communication on coordinating activity, because 
good proposals are a substitute for trying to coordinate investment simply through messages. 
Competition over proposals that are voted upon  also seems to restrain self-interest, because 
most proposers don’t propose that they themselves consume too much (compared to a 
myopic optimum), and they rarely propose consuming more than other agents. Agents 
usually vote for a proposal which pushes total capital over the productivity threshold, but not 
always. Voting also creates a little more volatility, because the capital stock sometimes goes 
above the critical threshold, then dips below it, within a single experimental horizon (this 
never happens when there is no voting).  
Adding communication generally interacts positively with voting because it produces 
more proposals that cross the critical capital-stock threshold, and more of those proposals 
actually are elected. Communication also restrains proposers further from proposing bad 
consumption plans in which they consume more than is optimal and create a capital stock 
below the critical threshold.  
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These inferences are obviously specific to this modest sample of economies with 
special structure, which implements key features of a standard theoretical model with the 
added twist of a productivity threshold that creates multiple equilibria. There are many 
directions for future research. The experimental design can easily be expanded to include 
many other features of interest to growth economists, such as the possibility of endogenous 
growth (e.g., investments in technology with increasing returns, beyond the critical-threshold 
externality included here), multiple sectors with linkages, incomplete property rights, 
unequal wealth and income distribution, multiple economies with trade and immigration, and 
more fiscal, monetary, or regulatory policy options, such as taxation and redistribution. 
Different political systems such as dictatorship, indirect democracy, socialism, and anarchy 
can also be compared. In addition, in the lab, the study of institutions is not restricted to ones 
that naturally occur. We can create unnatural hybrids, like free expression and voting over 
dictatorship (single-proposer systems) to see what happens.  
Institutions that are successful at producing wealth in one environment can be 
unpacked, and implemented in a different environment to test their robustness. Many 
questions spring to mind. Voting seems to work well here to restrain the proposers’ self-
interest, but is this due to competition between two proposers, to fear of verbal sanctions, or 
to proposer altruism? Voting also generates more volatility, with economies slipping below 
the productivity threshold within a common horizon; can including more proposers or 
different voting systems dampen this volatility? If certain kinds of messages facilitate 
growth, can we cause growth reliably by having some agents transmit these messages? 
Answers to questions like these are within our grasp with more experiments of this type, as 
theories and field observations suggest conjectures we can explore experimentally.  
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Table 1: Parameters of the model 
)( tCU : economy-wide utility 
function 
22400 tt CC −  
)( tKF : economy-wide production 
function 
5.0
tAK  
A: production-efficiency parameter 
31 if   ;771.16
31 if      ;88.7
≥=
<=
t
t
KA
KA
 
Kˆ : threshold level of capital stock 31 
ρ : discount rate 0.25 
δ : depreciation rate 1 
 
 
Table 2: Values of variables in equilibrium 
Variable Optimal Steady State Poverty Trap 
Capital (K) 45 9 
Consumption (C) 70 16 
Price (P) 118 334 
Welfare (U) 18,060 5,856 
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Table 3: Session information for all treatments 
Treatment Date # of  horizons
# of periods per 
horizon, h: 
(h1, h2, h3, …hi) 
Avg. 
 earnings 
 in Yen 
Avg.  
earnings 
in $§ 
Baseline      
Emory B1 03/22/04 5 (4, 7, 2, 2, 7) 25,343 39.24 
Emory B2 03/24/04 6 (3, 3, 7, 2, 1, 4) 23,801 36.84 
Emory B3 04/07/04 6 (5, 2, 1, 3, 4, 4) 28,678 47.26 
Caltech B1 07/08/04 4 (4, 4, 7, 6) 22,274 34.80 
Caltech B2 07/12/04 6 (2, 3, 3, 2, 3, 1) 17,007 26.87 
Communication      
Emory C1 03/22/04 2 (7, 7) 19,848 16.06 
Emory C2 03/23/04 5 (8, 1, 3, 5, 2) 27,607 23.57 
Emory C3 04/01/04 4 (3, 7, 6, 4) 23,458 19.26 
Caltech C1 07/15/04 5 (6, 1, 1, 2, 4) 14,219 11.56 
Caltech C2 07/19/04 5 (3, 4, 1, 3, 6) 33,060 28.64 
Caltech C3 10/07/04 4 (11, 2, 5, 2) 52,170 44.24 
Voting      
Emory V1 03/24/04 4 (11, 5, 3, 3) 36,767 31.05 
Emory V2 03/27/04 6 (6, 2, 1, 2, 5, 5) 25,750 21.86 
Emory V3 04/01/04 5 (1, 5, 1, 7, 4) 37,355 32.27 
Caltech V1 07/13/04 7 (6, 2, 4, 2, 1, 3, 5) 35,963 30.85 
Caltech V2 07/14/04 8 (3, 4, 8, 2, 1, 3, 1,2) 31,330 25.66 
Hybrid      
Emory H1 06/01/04 2 (4, 6) 17,202 27.15 
Emory H2 09/01/04 3 (8, 2, 4) 23,102 18.74 
Emory H3 09/01/04 4 (4, 4, 7, 4) 37,190 31.27 
Caltech H1 08/03/04 5 (5, 8, 2, 2, 2) 48,015 42.66 
Caltech H2 08/04/04 3 (2, 9, 2) 22,045 18.72 
 
§ = Conversion rates of experimental currency into US dollars differed depending on the 
treatment and player’s role. See section 2.3.6.
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Table 4: P-values for rank sum tests of differences in  
output and welfare between treatments 
Output    
  Communication Voting Hybrid 
Baseline 0.164 0.016 0.004 
Communication  0.214 0.214 
Voting   0.155 
Welfare    
  Communication Voting Hybrid 
Baseline 0.214 0.016 0.004 
Communication  0.214 0.123 
Voting   0.048 
 
Note: P-values are for one-tailed rank sum tests. The alternative hypothesis is that values of 
output or welfare for the treatment listed in the column are larger than values for the 
treatment listed in the row.  Therefore, a low p-value means the row treatment produces 
lower numbers than the column treatment. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Random-effects GLS estimation of the Effect of 
Communication Content on Capital Stock Level 
 
Communication R2=0.86   
  Estimated coefficient Std Error p>|t| 
Total available output 0.46 0.02 0.00 
Don't Consume 6.99 2.28 0.00 
Keep K (general) 1.13 2.18 0.61 
Specific Proposal  4.32 2.53 0.09 
Constant 1.71 1.50 0.25 
Hybrid R2=0.54   
  Estimated coefficient Std Error p>|t| 
Total available output 0.34 0.04 0.00 
Don't Consume 8.02 7.04 0.25 
Keep K (general) -5.12 3.37 0.13 
Specific Proposal  -5.95 4.46 0.18 
Constant 14.87 3.96 0.00 
Note: Dependent variable is economy-wide capital stock level.  
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Table 6: Influences on voting decisions, random-effects logit estimation
 
Voting Sessions Estimated coefficient Std Error p>|t| 
Higher own consumption 0.68 0.24 0.05 
Higher total K in the 
economy 0.81 0.24 0.73 
Closer to the myopic 
optimum consumption 0.01 0.02 0.75 
Equal investment 0.17 0.21 0.40 
Constant -0.96 0.31 0.00 
Hybrid Sessions    
Higher own consumption 1.05 0.28 0.00 
Higher total K in the 
economy 0.29 0.29 0.32 
Closer to the myopic 
optimum consumption -0.02 0.02 0.28 
Equal investment -0.27 0.28 0.33 
Constant -0.66 0.38 0.07 
 
Note: Dependent variable is 1 if agent votes for proposal, 0 otherwise.
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Figure 1: Aggregate Production and Demand Functions, discontinuous increase in 
input-output productivity when aggregate capital stock reaches 31. 
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Figures 2a-2d: Timing within a period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period t begins 
 
Stage 1 
 
 
Trading in 
call market 
 
Stage 2 
 
 
Allocation of 
output to ct 
Determine if 
horizon ends 
Period t ends Period t+1 begins 
Transfer kt+1 into 
output (ct+1+kt+2) 
Transfer kt into 
output (ct+kt+1) 
Voting
Baseline 
Communication 
Hybrid 
Period t begins 
 
Stage 1 
 
 
Trading in 
call market 
 
Stage 2
 
 
Propose 
allocation 
of output 
to ct 
Determine if 
horizon ends 
Period t ends Period t+1 begins 
Transfer kt+1 into 
output (ct+1+kt+2) 
Transfer kt into 
output (ct+kt+1) 
Vote for a 
proposed 
allocation  
Period t begins 
 
Stage 1 
 
 
Trading in 
call market 
 
Stage 2
 
 
Propose 
allocation 
of output 
to ct 
Determine if 
horizon ends 
Period t ends Period t+1 begins 
Transfer kt+1 into 
output (ct+1+kt+2) Transfer kt into 
output (ct+kt+1) 
Chat is allowed 
Chat is allowed 
Vote for a 
proposed 
allocation  
Period t begins 
 
Stage 1 
 
 
Trading in 
call market 
 
Stage 2 
 
 
Allocation of 
output to ct 
Determine if 
horizon ends 
Period t ends Period t+1 begins 
Transfer kt+1 into 
output (ct+1+kt+2) 
Transfer kt into 
output (ct+kt+1) 
Chat is allowed Chat is allowed 
 36
 
Figure 3: Observed and Equilibrium Aggregate Consumption, Baseline Treatment, 
C* optimal = 70, C* inferior = 16§ 
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§= Each data point represents a period in a horizon. Horizons are separated by spaces. For 
instance, in Emory B1 the first horizon had four periods. 
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Figure 4: Observed and Equilibrium Aggregate Consumption, Communication 
Treatment, C* optimal = 70, C* inferior = 16 
 
 
 
Emory C1
0
20
40
60
80
Time
Data C* optimal C* inferior
Emory C2
0
20
40
60
80
Time
Data C* optimal C* inferior
 
Emory C3
0
20
40
60
80
Time
Data C* optimal C* inferior
Caltech C1
0
20
40
60
80
Time
Data C* optimal C* inferior
 
Caltech C2
0
20
40
60
80
Time
Data C* optimal C* inferior
Caltech C3
0
20
40
60
80
Time
Data C* optimal C* inferior
 
 38
Figure 5: Observed and Equilibrium Aggregate Consumption, Voting Treatment, 
C* optimal = 70, C* inferior = 16 
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Figure 6: Observed and Equilibrium Aggregate Consumption, Hybrid Treatment,  
C* optimal = 70, C* inferior = 16 
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Figure 7: Observed and Threshold Level of Capital, Baseline Treatment, 
K threshold = 31 
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Figure 8: Observed and Threshold Level of Capital, Communication Treatment,  
K threshold = 31 
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Figure 9: Observed and Threshold Level of Capital, Voting Treatment,  
K threshold = 31 
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Figure 10: Observed and Threshold Level of Capital, Hybrid Treatment,  
K threshold = 31 
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Figure 11: Convergence Values and 95% Confidence Intervals for Capital Stock and 
Welfare, All Sessions and Treatments 
 
 
Baseline
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
0 20 40 60 80
capital
        
Voting
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
0 20 40 60 80
capital
 
 
 
Communication
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
0 20 40 60 80
capital
        
Hybrid
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
0 20 40 60 80
capital
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45
Figure 12: Observed Prices and Theoretical Predictions, Baseline Treatment 
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Figure 13: Observed Prices and Theoretical Predictions, Communication Treatment 
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 Figure 14: Observed Prices and Theoretical Predictions, Voting Treatment 
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Figure 15: Observed Prices and Theoretical Predictions, Hybrid Treatment 
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Figure 16a: Economy’s Capital Stock and Number of Agents Communicating a 
Willingness to Coordinate Investment, Communication Treatment 
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Figures 16b: Economy’s Capital Stock and Number of Agents Communicating A 
Willingness to Coordinate Investment, Hybrid Treatment 
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Appendix 
 
Table A-1: Convergence Estimation Results for Capital 
Random-Effects MLE 
Optimal Eq. Capital = 45, Poverty Trap Capital = 9 
 Coefficient B2 Std Error 
At the5% level, convergence value 
significantly different from: 
Baseline   Optimal Eq. Poverty Trap 
EmoryB1 11.29 2.45  No 
EmoryB2 10.95 3.12  No 
EmoryB3 18.65 6.41  No 
CaltechB1 13.14 2.87  No 
CaltechB2 33.34 6.46 No  
Communication     
EmoryC1 47.05 21.99 No No 
EmoryC2 28.81 5.64   
EmoryC3 10.49 1.11  No 
CaltechC1 10.74 2.60  No 
CaltechC2 55.83 3.10   
CaltechC3 54.86 1.33   
Voting     
EmoryV1 56.47 9.44 No  
EmoryV2 13.74 1.54   
EmoryV3 59.96 8.53 No  
CaltechV1 41.59 5.92 No  
CaltechV2 35.96 3.96   
Hybrid     
EmoryH1 31.08 11.38 No No 
EmoryH2 45.05 2.74 No  
EmoryH3 74.32 7.98   
CaltechH1 32.37 1.70   
CaltechH2 35.55 3.40   
 
 1
 
Table A-2: Convergence Estimation Results for Welfare 
Random-effects MLE 
Opt. Eq. Welfare = 18,060, Poverty Trap Welfare = 5,856 
Treatment  Coefficient B2 Std Error 
At the 5% level, convergence value 
significantly different from:  
Baseline   Optimal  Eq. Poverty Trap 
EmoryB1 4,436   428   
EmoryB2 4,336   918  No 
EmoryB3 9,910 1,824   
CaltechB1 3,729   653   
CaltechB2 9,536 2,364  No 
Communication     
EmoryC1   3,406   596  No 
EmoryC2 10,430 2,311   
EmoryC3   4,444   389   
CaltechC1   3,406   596   
CaltechC2 18,576 1,888 No  
CaltechC3 19,952   902 No  
Voting     
EmoryV1 11,118 1,857  No 
EmoryV2   4,885   411  No 
EmoryV3 14,969 1,920 No  
CaltechV1 13,006 2,294   
CaltechV2 8,933 2,031  No 
Hybrid     
EmoryH1 11,867 3,108   
EmoryH2 11,900 1,088   
EmoryH3 17,341 1,709 No  
CaltechH1 20,697 1,273 No  
CaltechH2 12,031 2,267   
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Table A-3: The content of communication, all sessions,  
communication and hybrid treatments 
 
Session   Time Observed (Horizon, Period) 
EmoryC1 Don't Consume (H1, 5), (H2, 1) 
 Keep K (general) (H1, 1), (H1, 6), (H1, 7), (H2, 1), (H2, 4) 
 Specific Proposal  (H2, 2), (H2, 3) 
EmoryC2 Don't Consume (H1, 2), (H2, 1), (H3, 1), (H4, 1), (H5, 1), (H5, 2) 
 Keep K (general) (H1, 1), (H1, 2), (H5, 1) 
EmoryC3 Don't Consume (H4, 3) 
CaltechC1 Don't Consume (H1, 2), (H1, 3) 
 Keep K (general) (H1, 2), (H1, 3), (H1, 4), (H1, 5) 
 Specific Proposal  (H1, 1), (H2, 1), (H4, 1) 
CaltechC2 Don't Consume (H1, 2), (H1, 3), (H2, 2) 
 Keep K (general) (H1, 2), (H1, 3), (H2, 2), (H2, 3), (H4, 2) 
 Specific Proposal  (H1, 3), (H2, 1), (H2, 3), (H3, 1), (H4, 2) 
CaltechC3 Don't Consume (H1, 1), (H2, 1) 
 Keep K (general) (H1, 1), (H1, 4) 
EmoryH1 Keep K (general) (H1, 3), (H1, 4), (H2, 1) 
EmoryH2 Keep K (general) (H1, 2) 
EmoryH3 Don't Consume (H1, 1), (H3, 2), (H4, 1) 
 Keep K (general) (H1, 1), (H2, 2), (H2, 3), (H4, 3) 
CaltechH1 Keep K (general) (H1, 1), (H1, 3), (H1, 4), (H1, 5), (H2, 1), (H2, 2) 
 Specific Proposal  
(H2, 5), (H2, 6), (H2, 7), (H3, 1), (H3, 2), (H4, 1), (H4, 2), 
(H5, 1) 
CaltechH2 Keep K (general) (H2, 2), (H2, 4), (H3, 2) 
 
 
  
The remainder of this document contains the instructions for the baseline 
treatment of the experiment to aid the referees and editors in evaluating the 
manuscript. The instructions for communication and voting treatments were 
identical to the baseline’s instructions, except for a section that described the 
chat room and the voting process, respectively. The hybrid treatment included 
both a chatting and a voting section. Instructions for these three treatments 
are available to the referees and editors upon request.  
Please note that this material is not intended for publication. 
  
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENT 
1. General Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. The instructions are simple and 
if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount 
of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The amount of 
payment you receive depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and 
partly on chance. The currency used in the market is Yen. All trading will be in terms of the 
Yen. The cash payment to you at the end of the experiment will be in US dollars. The 
conversion rate is _____ Yen to 1 US dollar. 
 
Once the experiment has started, no one is allowed to talk to anybody other than the 
experimenter. Anyone who violates this rule will lose his or her right to participate in this 
experiment. In addition to your earnings from the activity in the experiment, you will receive 
a …… payment for your participation. 
 
2. Basic Concepts 
 
The experiment will consist of a sequence of periods. At the beginning of each period, you 
will begin with a Cash Endowment of ______ Yen. You will also be given _____ units of a 
good called K on a one-time basis at the beginning of the first period of the experiment.  
 
In each period, there will be an open market. You will use this market to buy and sell units 
of K. Buying units of K reduces your cash by the amount of Yen that you pay for your 
purchases, whereas selling increases the cash you have by the amount that you receive for 
your sales. Thus, selling and buying K determines in part the earnings you make in each 
period.  
 
In addition, you will have a chance to choose how many units of K to consume. How much 
of K you consume during a period will also in part determine your earnings for the period. 
The K you do not consume can grow and can be sold or consumed in future periods.  
 
 1
Your earnings in a period are equal to the amount of cash you have after buying and/or 
selling K minus the cash you began the period with, plus the earnings you receive from 
the consumption of K. A detailed explanation of how to buy, sell and consume units of K is 
given later on in these instructions. 
 
Each period is divided into stages. In stage 1, you can buy and sell units of K. In stage 2, you 
decide how much to consume. In stage 3, the K you have is converted to a different quantity 
of K that you begin the next period with. 
 
 
3. Stage 1: Buying and Selling Units of K 
 
The picture shown below is a copy of the first screen that you will see during Stage 1 of each 
period of the experiment. At the top of the screen you can find the Period number, the Total 
Earnings you have in Yen and the Remaining Time in seconds that you have to complete 
Stage 1. Below this information, you will find the number of Units of K You Hold, indicating 
the number of K that you currently have. You will also find the Units of K in the Economy, 
which is the total K that all five players currently have. You will also see the Cash 
Endowment for the period, indicating how much cash you currently have available for 
transactions.  
 
3.1 Sending in Limit Prices to the Market 
 
You will use this screen to indicate the number of units of K you want to trade. You do so 
using the spaces Units of K and Limit Price. Under Units of K, you must enter a series of 
numbers in an increasing manner. The numbers will appear in the large window on the left 
portion of the screen. Type in a 1 for the first row, a 2 for the second row, a 3 for third row, 
etc… Enter as many numbers as the most units of K that you are willing to hold. The 
minimum quantity of units you can list is equal to the number of K you currently hold, the 
maximum quantity of units you can list is equal to the number of units in the economy.  
 
In the Limit Price field you must enter a limit price for each unit you list. The role of limit 
prices will be explained shortly. Each unit number must be accompanied by a limit price for 
the unit. The limit price will also appear in the large window on the left portion of the screen. 
Enter the limit price next to its corresponding unit. For example, if you enter 500 next to unit 
1, it means that your limit price for the first unit is 500. If you enter a limit price of 450 next 
to the 2nd unit, it means that your limit price for the second unit is 450, and so on. 
 
The limit price for each additional unit must be less or equal to the previous one. For 
example, if you list a limit price of 123 Yen for the first unit, the second unit’s limit price 
must be equal or less than 123 Yen; similarly, the third unit’s price must be less or equal to 
the second unit’s price. All prices must be greater than zero. After entering a unit number and 
its corresponding limit price, you must click on Update; you will see your choices recorded 
in the column entitled List of your choices. At any time you can modify your choice. You can 
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also select the keys Erase all choices, which clears all of your limit prices, Erase last choice, 
which will remove the limit price for the highest numbered unit, and Repeat, which will enter 
an identical price for the next unit. Once you are satisfied with your decision, you can send 
your limit prices to the market by clicking on Validate.  
 
 
 
 
3.2 Finding how much you buy or sell 
 
Whether you will buy or sell units and how much you buy or sell depends on how your limit 
price compares to others’ limit prices, and how many units are in the economy.  
After all players have entered all of their limit prices and validated them, the prices that all 
players have sent in are ranked together from the highest to the lowest. Those who enter the 
highest prices will possess the units in the economy after stage 1. For example, suppose that 
there are ten units in the economy. Those that send in the ten highest limit prices will then 
receive the ten units in the economy.  
 
Often, the people who send in the highest limit prices will not be those who currently have 
the units. In that case, the people with the highest limit prices automatically purchase them 
from the people who currently have the units. Consider the following example. There are five 
players. Players 1, 2, and 3 each currently have one unit of K and players 4 and 5 do not have 
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any units of K. Thus there are three units of K in the economy. Suppose that player 1 sends in 
a limit price of 500 for one unit of K. Player 2 sends in a limit price of 400 for one unit. 
Player 3 sends in a limit price of 600 for her first unit and 550 for her second unit. Player 4 
sends in a bid of 630 for one unit. Player 5 sends in a limit price of 400 for one unit. In this 
example, player 3 receives two units and player 4 receives one unit of the total of three units 
of K that exist in the economy. This means that players 1 and 2 each sell one unit (they each 
had one before and will not have any after the market process) and players 3 and 4 each 
purchase one unit (player 3 had one already before the market process and player 4 did not 
have any).   
 
As is clear from the above example, you are more likely to buy units for which the limit price 
is high and you are more likely to sell units for which the limit price is low compared to 
others’ limit prices. Of course, at the time you choose your prices, you will not know what 
other players are doing. You must send in a number of limit prices that is at least as great as 
the number of units of K you currently have. To purchase units, you must send in more than 
that number. 
3.3 The price paid for purchases and sales 
 
When you are required to sell a unit you receive some cash from the sale, increasing your 
earnings. Likewise, when you purchase units you are required to spend cash to obtain the 
units, decreasing your earnings. The price at which participants buy and sell their units, 
which we will refer to as the market price, is determined in the following manner.  
 
When the limit prices are ranked from highest to lowest, we take the limit price that is ranked 
in the spot corresponding to the number of units of K in the economy. This price is called the 
market price. For example, for the limit prices described in the last subsection and three units 
in the economy, the third highest limit price submitted overall, the 550 player 3 sent in, 
becomes the market price. The market price is a per-unit price, so that if for example an 
individual buys five units, she pays five times the market price. 
 
4. Consuming Units of K 
 
In each period, after stage 1 is completed, all players enter stage 2. Below you will find a 
picture of the screen you see in Stage 2. At the top of the screen you will see the current 
Period, your Total Earnings in Yen for the experiment so far and the Remaining Time you 
have to complete this stage in seconds. The data from Stage 1 and the results from trading are 
also on this screen. On your screen, you will see Units of K at starting, which indicates the 
number of units you started the period with, the Units of K in the Economy, and your Cash 
Endowment. The screen also displays the Market Price, the price at which people bought and 
sold units in stage 1, K bought/sold on your part in stage 1, Cash transferred by you in stage 
1 and Cash after trading, indicating how much cash you currently have. 
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Below these columns, you will see a row called Your Limit Prices summarizing the prices 
that you listed in Stage 1 for each unit; starting with the limit price you sent in for your first 
unit, followed by the limit price for the second, etc. A star separates these prices. The second 
row shows All Player’s Limit Prices. These are the prices that everyone in the market listed 
in Stage 1 for each of their units. The numbers are read in the following way. The 
parentheses indicate (the rank of the limit price, the limit price entered, the player who 
submitted the unit). They are displayed in order from the highest limit price to the lowest.     
 
In this Stage, you need to choose how many of the units of K you currently have that you 
want to consume. Consuming a unit increases your earnings but removes the K you consume 
from your inventory and from the economy. How consumption affects your earnings in Yen 
for the period can be determined using your Redemption Value Sheet, which you received 
at the beginning of the experiment. 
 
4.1 Redemption Value Sheet and Consumption 
 
The Redemption Value Sheet attached to these instructions shows the value in Yen from 
consuming units of K. The first column labeled Units of K consumed numbers the units from 
1 through 28. The column labeled Unit Value indicates the additional amount of Yen you 
receive from consuming the unit indicated in the same row in the first column. The column 
Total Value shows the total amount of Yen you receive for consuming the quantity shown in 
the corresponding row in the first column. Notice that if more than 20 units of K are 
consumed, the value is the same as for 20 units, indicating that there is no additional value 
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from consuming more than 20 units. The computer calculates your earnings in Yen 
automatically; you will see the number on the Stage 2 screen shown above once you validate 
your choice by clicking on Validate. 
 
You can use the table entitled Simulator to help you make your decisions. On this table, you 
could see how your decision of how many units of K to consume will affect your earnings 
from consumption in Yen and the remaining K you have for next period. In the first field, 
you will find your Units of K Currently. In the second field, labeled Units Converted to C (C 
stands for consumption), you can type the number of units of K that you want to consume for 
the period. You must choose a number that is greater than or equal to 0 and less that or equal 
to number of units of K that you currently hold. After you make your decision, the remaining 
K will be recorded under Units of Remaining K. Under Earnings from Units Converted to C 
you will see the value in Yen resulting from your consumption of K. Finally, the Screen also 
shows the Units of K remaining at the beginning of next period if the economy wide K is less 
than 31 and if the economy wide K is greater than 30. The importance of the threshold level 
of K in the economy is explained in section 5. You can type different hypothetical amounts 
under Units Converted to C and click on Simulate to see how much K you would have next 
period and what your earnings would be if you chose that level of consumption. Once you 
make a final decision, type your decision where it says Your Final Choice and press Validate. 
 
5. Production 
 
The remaining K, that is, the amount of K that remains after you make your consumption 
decision, can be carried over to the next period. This K will be automatically converted to 
possibly more K. The amount that it is converted into is based on your Production 
Schedule. Thus, the amount of K you will have at the beginning of next period depends on 
the remaining K you have after consuming at the end of the current period and on your 
Production Schedule.  
 
5.1 Production Schedule 
 
The Production Schedule consists of two parts. When the total amount of K that the whole 
group has at the end of each period is less than or equal to 30, that is when the K in the 
Economy (that is the total Remaining K for all five people) is less than or equal to 30, use the 
left-hand-side of the Production Schedule to determine the amount of K that will be available 
to you at the beginning of next period. When the total remaining K in the economy exceeds 
30, then you should use the right-hand-side of the schedule. In determining which side of the 
schedule is used, the total Remaining K is measured after consumption and before it grows at 
the beginning of the next period. 
 
Under the column labeled Remaining K you will find the number of units of K you have 
remaining after your consumption decision. The number next to it in the column labeled K at 
Market Open Next Period is the amount of good K that will available to you at the beginning 
of next period. The calculation for determining how many units of K you have in the next 
period is done automatically by the computer. 
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6. Summary of Period Earnings 
 
At the end of each period, the screen you see, entitled Final Results for Period will display a 
summary of the activity in the period. It will indicate your earnings in Yen for the period and 
your total earnings in the experiment thus far.  Remember that earnings for the period in Yen 
are given by the cash endowment remaining after trading, minus your cash endowment at the 
beginning of the period, plus your earnings from consumption. That is: 
 
Earnings for a period in Yen = cash endowment remaining after trading – cash 
endowment at the beginning of the period + period earnings from consumption 
 
7. Ending the Experiment 
 
The period in which the experiment ends is determined in the following way. Before the 
experiment began, the experimenter rolled a 10-sided die a series of times to determine how 
long the experiment would continue. If the die came up with number 1 or 2 on the first roll, 
then the game will end after the first period and there are no more die rolls. Otherwise, if the 
die roll resulted in a number from 3 to 10, the experiment will go on to the next period, and 
the die is rolled again. If the die came up 1 or 2 on the second roll, the experiment will end 
after period 2. In other words, in any given period, there is a fixed 20 percent chance (the 
odds are 2 in 10) that the experiment ends right after the current period. There is always a 80 
percent chance that there will be at least one more period after the current one.  
 
However, the experiment will be restarted if it ends with more than half an hour remaining 
during the time for which you have been recruited. If it is restarted, you will again begin with 
the same number of units that you started with in period 1. On the other hand, if the 
experiment is still in progress at the end of the time for which you have been recruited, the 
experiment will be continued on another afternoon or evening. The experimenter will run 
another session, in which the beginning holding of K for each individual will be the same as 
the end of the current session. You are free to participate in the continuation of the session 
with the same ID number, picking up from where you left off today. If you choose not to 
continue on with the session at a later date, another participant will be recruited to take your 
place. The earnings of the participant filling your place will also be given to you for the 
remainder of the life of the current series of periods. 
 
8. The History Screen 
 
During stage 1 or stage 2, you can click on the button labeled History and you can access a 
history of your choices and of market activity for each past period. The information you can 
access includes the amount of K you held, the amount of K in the economy, your limit prices, 
the market price, the amount of K traded, the cash you have after trading, your earnings from 
consumption, the K remaining after your consumption, your period earnings, and your 
cumulative earnings.  
 
